Why does plato hate democracy VideoDemocracy and the Road to Tyranny why does plato hate democracy
Let me rehash how I got to the premise of that question. I then pointed out that in this modified system of competitive running, small early victories due to random variation would snowball over time to the point where two people who were equal in ability and hard work would end up starting so far apart that one would always win.
The systematic structural features that would give rise to this outcome were linking the starting point of the next phase of competition is linked to the outcome of the previous and small differences in early advantage there will always be random variation in early performances. If the 2n rule were in effect, why does plato hate democracy running would no longer be meritocratic in the hafe sense. I even showed that one person could even be a bit better in terms of performance in the long run but, due to a slightly worse first race plus the 2n rule, ends up further and further behind. The point of the analogy is not hard to see: any modern economy that rewards performance with better future opportunities will inevitably fail to be meritocratic, because any such economy will also display linking and small http://rectoria.unal.edu.co/uploads/tx_felogin/benjamin-franklin-s-theory-of-life-and/hobbes-and-machiavelli.php in early advantage.
But my point is that even if we do think of it that way, meritocracy so defined will be forever out of reach. Nevertheless—and here learn more here my answer to the question—there are two ideas we can peel off of the mirage ideal of meritocracy that might be feasible and why does plato hate democracy striving for, with the first ahte uncontroversial and the second being a bitter pill. This ideal would just limit the pernicious factors that might influence the flow of rewards and opportunities within a society: family connections, wealth, bribery, favoritism, prejudices about skin color or sexual orientation, and so on.
That is, though we might find it impossible to systematically link reward with what people deserve, we can at the very least screen off clearly immoral distortions in the way rewards are distributed. Dos, for example, that in my hypothetical system of competitive running with the 2n rule, it is still not the case that people get ahead due to nepotism, prejudice, bribery, etc.
And link it was part of the original ideal of meritocracy that rewards should follow desert rather than family connections, etc. The second idea is just justice tempered linking. Linking—or the idea that future reward and opportunity are linked to past performance—is an why does plato hate democracy component of any economic system that would incentivize hard work.
The problem is that there is no way to achieve linking and thereby incentive without also providing more opportunity to those who have gotten ahead due to irrelevant factors, like random variation at early stages. And, of course, it appears better for everyone if hard work is incentivized. Still, that leaves a lot open.
THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE
Note that in our analogy, linking was achieved via the 2n rule. We could just as well have achieved linking via a 1. So the idea of justice tempered linking is that the mechanisms of reward for performance, while never perfectly in accord with what just deserts would be, could still be made more or less just. This second idea is indeed a bitter pill, because it involves acceptance of the fact that modern economies will never be able to get right what people deserve morally. Still, striving for the negative ideal of meritocracy and for justice why does plato hate democracy linking will do much to help us approximate moral desert.]